Another most cogent reason why the policy of the Declara- tion should be adopted by the Allies lay in the state of Russia herself. Russian Jews had been secretly active on behalf of the Central Powers from the first ; they had become the chief agents of German pacifist propaganda ; by 1917 they had done much in preparation for that general disintegration of Russian national life, later recognized as the revolution. It was believed that if Great Britain declared for the fulfilment of Zionist aspirations in Palestine under her own pledge, one effect would be to bring Russian Jewry to the cause of the Entente.

It was believed, also, that such a declaration would have a potent influence upon world Jewry in the same way, and secure for the Entente the aid of Jewish financial interests. It was believed, further, that it would greatly influence American opinion in favour of the Allies. Such were the chief considera- tions which, during the later part of 1916 and the next ten months of 1917, impelled the British Government towards making a contract with Jewry.

But when the matter came before the Cabinet for decision delays occurred. Amongst influential English Jews Zionism had few supporters, at all events for a Zion in Palestine. It had still fewer in France. Jewish influence both within and without the Cabinet is understood to have exerted itself strenuously and pertinaciously against the policy of the proposed Declaration.

Under the pressure of Allied needs the objections of the anti-Zionists were either over-ruled or the causes of objection removed, and the Balfour Declaration, as we have seen, was published to the world on 2nd November 1917. That it is in purpose a definite contract with Jewry is beyond question. Subsequently the Declaration was accepted and endorsed by the Governments of France, Italy, and Japan.

A History of the Peace Conference of Paris Volume VI by H.W.V. Temperley